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What the Marriage Equality Cases Tell Us
About Voter ID
Ellen D. Katzt

Two years ago, United States u. Windsor 1 tossed out the
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"). 2 Thereafter, proponents of
marriage equality secured dozens of notable victories in the
lower courts, a smattering of setbacks, 3 and last June, the
victory they sought in Obergefell u. Hodges. 4
During this same period, opponents of electoral restrictions
such as voter identification have seen far less sustained success.
Decided the day before Windsor, Shelby County u. Holder 5
scrapped a key provision of the Voting Rights Act (''VRA") while
making clear that plaintiffs might still challenge disputed voting
regulations under Section 2 of the VRA and the Constitution
itself. 6 The litigation that followed produced a select number of
pro-plaintiff rulings, 7 all of which have now been stayed 8 or
t Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to
Mary Shelly for excellent research assistance and to the University of Michigan Law
School, which provided generous financial support for this project through the Cook
Endowment.
1
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2
See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3
See, e.g., Freedom to Marry, Marriage Rulings in the Courts, available at
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8LCC-4GMT (updated Jan. 27, 2015), .
4
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
6
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
7
See Ohio State Conference of NAACP. v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio
2014), aff'd Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2014);
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193,
2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v.
North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). For plaintiff successes in state law
challenges to electoral restrictions, see Martin v. Kohls, 444 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2014);
Applewhite v. Pennsylvania, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2014 WL 184988, at *17 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. Jan. 17, 2014).
8
See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014);
Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); Frank v.
Walker, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); Veasey v. Perry, 135
S. Ct. 9 (2014) (denying motion to vacate stay); Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the
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overruled by higher courts. 9 The Supreme Court has yet to rule
decisively, 10 but its rulings to date portend a rough road ahead
for the voting plaintiffs. 11
The voting and marriage cases since Windsor and Shelby
County raise distinct questions and neither is controlling nor
even applicable precedent for the other. This Article
nevertheless considers the prospect that these cases have not
proceeded wholly independently of one another, and, more
specifically, that the marriage cases decided between Windsor
and Obergefell shaped the trajectory of the voting disputes. The
goal is not to prove the existence of such influence, but instead
to use the prospect of it as a lens through which to examine
various linkages between the two lines of cases. 12
Like the marriage plaintiffs, the voting plaintiffs allege that
the regulations they challenge significantly burden a
fundamental right; that the state interests offered in defense are
inadequate; and that intentional discrimination based on race
and sex is present and relevant. In the marriage cases leading
up to Obergefell, courts were inclined to deem the burden on the
implicated right severe, the state interests unworthy, and the
animating intent problematic. More deference, by contrast, has
been given to state decision-making in the voting cases.
This greater deference stems, in part, from the familiar
distinction between discriminatory intent and discriminatory
effect, with the challenged voting rules often understood to fall
into the latter, more deferentially reviewed category. 13 But not
all of the voting rules recently challenged may be so
characterized. A federal court ruling finding that intentional
racial discrimination underlies the contested Texas voter ID

NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (granting application to for stay); see also Green Party of
Tenn. v. Hargett, No. 2:13-cv-224 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/208815196/TN-Opinion-on-Voter-ID, archived at, http://
perma.cc/47CH-X6QZ (rejecting challenge to Tennessee Voter ID measure).
9
Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014).
10
See Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
11
See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, No. 14-803, 2015 WL 131119, at *l (U.S. Mar. 23,
2015); Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Husted, 135 S. Ct. at 42
(Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., dissenting).
12
For a discussion of another way Shelby County and Windsor are connected, see
Bertran L. Ross, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby County, and Judicial District of
the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2027 (2014).
13
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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provision stands among the pro-plaintiff, post-Shelby County
decisions that are presently inoperative. 14 As a result, the line
separating intent from effect cannot alone explain the greater
degree of deference accorded to state action in the voting cases.
Instead, this deference may reflect a less noticed, but deeply
consequential fault line emerging within the category of conduct
captured by the label of "intentional discrimination." This line
separates conduct that targets members of a minority group for
disfavored treatment based on animus from conduct that targets
them for more particularized, instrumental reasons. The
distinction, which builds on the foundation set in Shelby County,
resurrects and recasts a line between invidious and benign
intentional discrimination, isolating animus for condemnation,
and functionally immunizing more instrumental conduct that
imposes disfavored treatment for reasons other than the
expression of bigotry.
This distinction-presently suggested by existing case law
but yet to be fully operationalized-is unwarranted. State action
crafted to impose significant and selective burdens on members
of minority groups has long been understood as the cause of
enduring injury, regardless of whether the underlying intent is
grounded animus or more calculated concerns. 15 Deploying the
distinction to cabin actionable discrimination caricatures is how
unchecked discrimination operated prior to the civil rights
movement and the shape it has taken ever since. It shields a
good deal of conduct that has long fallen within the category of
intentional discrimination and has long been seen as the cause
of disadvantage.
The distinction also obscures a critical observation
repeatedly made in the marriage cases leading to and including
Obergefell itself that should apply in the voting disputes but has
yet to find expression. Same-sex marriage bans are now
understood to inflict a dignitary harm on same-sex couples by
denying them the ability to participate in marriage as oppositesex couples do as a matter of course. Many of the voting
restrictions challenged post-Shelby County might be understood
to inflict a similar dignitary harm. Onerous voter ID measures,
for instance, force voters who lack conventional ID to traverse
14

See Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014);
see also infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
15
See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
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numerous hurdles in order to cast a ballot in the same manner
as voters who acquired qualifying ID for other purposes are able
to do without thought or effort. Such measures make voting an
ordeal for distinct groups of voters and, while they may not
wholly preclude participation, deny these voters the public
recognition
that
comes
from
casting
a
ballot
"without hindrance."16
To date, however, the concept of dignity plays no
meaningful role in the voting disputes. Courts that have found
for the voting plaintiffs focus on the tangible costs challenged
voting restrictions impose rather than the affront to dignitary
interests they might be understood to inflict. The critical way
dignity has been deployed in the marriage cases leading up to
and including Obergefell nevertheless suggests that the concept
should have traction in the voting disputes as well.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the ways in
which the voting and marriage plaintiffs have pressed
structurally similar claims and the greater degree of deference
accorded to state action in voting cases. Part II argues that an
emerging and deeply flawed distinction between animus-based
and more calculated intentional discrimination may explain the
different levels of deference accorded in the two lines of cases.
Part III suggests that the challenged voting regulations might
be seen to inflict a dignitary harm that resembles the dignitary
injury same-sex marriage bans are now understood to impose. It
offers some preliminary thoughts on the contours of this injury
and the challenges its recognition might present.

I.

LINKING THE VOTING AND MARRIAGE CLAIMS

Handed down twenty-four hours apart, Shelby County v.
Holder 17 and United States v. Windsor 18 both struck down
federal statutes, but emphasized plaintiffs might still pursue
federal claims to challenge at least some of the state conduct
regulated by the invalidated statutes. Shelby County stated that
conduct of the sort Congress targeted in its 2006
Reauthorization of the VRA might still be actionable under

16

17

18

See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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Section 2 of the VRA and the Constitution itself. 19 Windsor, in
turn, invalidated DOMA as an intrusion on state power while
suggesting that bans on same-sex marriage might deny samesex couples equal protection and due process of law. 20
From the start, these claims shared broad structural
similarities. This Part focuses on two: the contentions that the
challenged state regulations significantly burden a fundamental
right and that the state interests offered to justify the
challenged regulations are (or were) either insufficiently weighty
or wholly implausible. Courts evaluating these claims have,
overall, accorded more deference to state action in the voting
disputes than in the marriage cases leading to Obergefell.
Weighing the Burden

A.

In the litigation that followed Windsor, the marriage
plaintiffs have repeatedly established a significant burden on
the right to marry despite the availability of civil unions or
domestic partnerships that provide many, albeit hardly all, of
the benefits of marriage. Meanwhile, the voting plaintiffs have
been called upon to show that a challenged regulation leaves
them wholly unable to vote. Alternative means of participation,
including far more difficult means, must be entirely unavailable.
Since Windsor, the marriage plaintiffs were remarkably
successful in persuading courts that bans on same-sex marriage
significantly burden the right to marry. 21 Courts consistently
agreed that such bans deny same-sex couples numerous tangible
and intangible benefits of marriage. They observed, inter alia,
that "[m]arriage confers respectability on a sexual relationship;"
that excluding a couple from marriage "denies it a coveted
status," 22 and its children "the recognition essential to stability,
predictability, and dignity" 23 and thus labels these families "as
second-class." 24 Even Deboer u. Snyder, 25 which upheld several
19

Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2630--31.
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct.at 2693, 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also generally
Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion,
6 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 87 (2014).
21
See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
22
Id. at 658, 670.
23
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014).
24
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Bostic v. Schaefer,
760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (Same-sex marriage ban "prohibits [same-sex couples]
from participating fully in our society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the
20
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same-sex marriage bans, refused to "deny the costs" those bans
imposed on the plaintiffs, observing that they "den[y] gay
couples the opportunity to publicly solemnize, to say nothing of
subsidize, their relationships under state law ... depriv[ing]
them of benefits that range from the profound . . . to
the mundane." 26
Notably, these courts held that civil unions and domestic
partnerships did not mitigate the burden that bans on same-sex
marriage imposed. They deemed these marriage "lite" regimes
inadequate substitutes for the full panoply of benefits and
respectability marriage accords. 27 One district court, for
instance, observed that "even if the tangible benefits of a
domestic partnership are similar to marriage, creating a
'separate but equal' institution still connotes a secondclass status." 28
In the voting context, a number of lower courts have
similarly found that challenged electoral regulations
significantly burden voting rights. 29 For example, district courts
in Wisconsin and Texas observed that voters who lacked
compliant ID under state law found obtaining such ID involved
Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456,
478 (E.D. Va. 2014) (same sex marriage ban "needlessly stigmatiz[es] and humiliate[s]
children" being raised by same-sex couples and "needlessly deprive[s them] of the
protection, the stability, the recognition and the legitimacy that marriage conveys").
25
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
26
Id. at 407-08. But see Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp.3d 910, 919, 923 (E.D.
La. 2014) (holding that same sex couples in Louisiana experience no significant burdens
to their constitutional rights given that "Louisiana's laws apply evenhandedly to both
genders-whether between two men or two women" and that "[t]here is simply no
fundamental right, historically or traditionally, to same-sex marriage").
27
See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 670 (noting that "the rights and obligations of
domestic partners are far more limited than those of married persons"); Obergefell v.
Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 975 (S.D. Ohio 2013) rev'd sub nom., DeBoer, 772 F.3d at
388 (noting statements in legislative history acknowledging that compared to marriage,
domestic partnerships would not "have all the bells and whistles," "[p]erhaps don't have
all the opportunities," and do not appear "equal to everyone else's").
28
Wolfv. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1005-06 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
29
Plaintiffs must make this claim whether they are challenging electoral
restrictions as unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote or as violations of the VRA
Section 2. Section 2 proscribes electoral practices that result in a denial or abridgement
of the right to vote on the basis of race or membership in a protected group, and it
requires plaintiffs to show that they have less ability to participate and elect
representatives than do white voters, a standard that is established through the totality
of circumstances. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1011-12 (1994). In practice, this inquiry requires plaintiffs to establish many of the same
elements that they must show to establish a constitutional violation under the BurdickAnderson balancing test.
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numerous time-consuming and costly tasks, 30 and that the
opportunities to vote without such ID were themselves
onerous. 31 Similarly, both a district and appellate court held
that reduced opportunities for early in-person voting ("EIP") in
Ohio significantly burdened African-American and low-income
voters, groups who had been more likely to use EIP voting than
white, higher income voters. 32 This burden was mitigated
neither by the availability to vote by mail, 33 nor by the prospect
that some affected voters would still cast ballots. 34 So too, North
Carolina's elimination of same-day registration and out-ofprecinct voting was understood to impose a significant burden
on African-American voters, 35 the appellate court found no need

30

See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854-62 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (discussing
steps required to secure compliant ID); Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL
5090258, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014); id. at *48 (noting fees and "the extra, often
lengthy, trips" required to secure, "the absence of guidance the State provided on the
requirements" and the choice it imposed between "go[ing] to work or go[ing to] get a
photo ID;" see also Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting costs "deliberately imposed by the State," that are "at odds" with precedent, and
that are "not small").
31
See Frank, 17 F. Supp. at 854-62; see also Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 785
(7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting state required photo ID for first time
absentee voters, those who changed addresses or their name for marriage or other
reason); Veasey, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21, *48 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014)
(describing creation of "a second class of voters who can only vote by mail" and that
obtaining "free" state ID still required costs to provide underlying documents,
transportation, the prospect of being fingerprinted and overcoming widespread
impression that process involved screening for outstanding warrants). Cf Veasey v.
Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 2014) (granting stay despite recognition that
individual voter plaintiffs may be harmed by its decision).
32
See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 838, 841-42
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (finding the burden significant and noting absence of EIP evening hours
and the reduction of Sunday voting to a single Sunday despite widespread black voter
participation in Sunday "souls to polls" initiatives).
33
See id. at 827-28 (noting evidence that voting by mail was complex, prone to
produce disqualifying errors, and mistrusted by the voters most affected by the reduction
in EIP).
34
See id. at 851 (grounding Section 2 violation in fact that "reductions to EIP
voting ... result in fewer voting opportunities for African Americans than other groups
of voters, as it will be more difficult for African Americans to vote during the days and
hours currently scheduled than for members of other groups."); see also Ohio State
Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 541-44 (6th Cir. 2014).
35
See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322, 348-49
(M.D. N.C. 2014) (crediting evidence that African-American voters used SDR "at a higher
rate than whites in the three federal elections during which SDR was offered"); League
of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding
that plaintiffs were likely to succeed with claim).
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for plaintiffs to demonstrate they "cannot register or vote under
any circumstance."36
These rulings, however, have all since been stayed, 37 and
one has been overruled on its merits. 38 The merits opinion,
written by Judge Frank Easterbrook, stated that Wisconsin's
voter ID imposed, at most, a minimal burden.39 Judge
Easterbrook posited that many Wisconsin voters lacking the
requisite identification would not vote for reasons unrelated to
their lack of ID, while others without ID were simply "unwilling
to invest the necessary time" to obtain a qualifying ID. 40 By
contrast, a legally significant burden on the right to vote arose
only when voters were or would be wholly unable to accomplish
what the law requires them to do. 41
The suggestion that impermissible burdens arise only when
eligible voters are categorically unable to vote stems from the
Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Crawford u. Marion County
Board of Elections. 42 That decision rejected a constitutional
challenge to Indiana's voter ID law, deeming the burden the
requirement imposed on most voters to be inconsequential, and
the special burden it imposed on particularly disadvantaged
voters indeterminate. 43 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion
nevertheless left open the prospect that some plaintiffs might
yet successfully challenge the law as applied to them, but did
not fully explain what such plaintiffs would need to show
to prevail. 44

36
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 243 (stating that "waiving off
disproportionately high African American use of certain curtailed registration and voting
mechanisms as mere 'preferences' that do not absolutely preclude participation" an
abuse of discretion); N.C. State Conference, 997 F. Supp. at 350-51 (''That voters
preferred to use SDR over these methods does not mean that without SDR voters lack
equal opportunity.").
37
See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (denying motion to vacate stay); Veasey v.
Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); Frank v. Walker, 769
F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (staying district court order); see also Frank v. Walker, 135 S.
Ct. 7 (2014).
38
See Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 2014).
39 Id.
40
Id. at 749 (suggesting "that people who do not plan to vote also do not go out of
their way to get a photo ID that would have no other use to them").
41
Id. at 746-48, 753.
42
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187, 202 (2008).
43
Id. at 198-99.
44
Id. at 202-03.
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The opinion made clear that successful plaintiffs would need
to provide more information on the burden imposed by the
measure than the plaintiffs had provided in Crawford. Justice
Stevens held, for instance, that the evidence in the case did not
show that any voter "will have his or her right to vote unduly
burdened" by the ID requirement, and said "virtually nothing
about the difficulties faced by either indigent voters or voters
with religious objections to being photographed." 45 And yet, the
opinion also intimated that plaintiffs could not prevail unless
they demonstrated a complete inability to vote. Justice Stevens,
for example, observed that the record evidence did not document
"a single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote
as a result of SEA 483."46 And he made sure to point out that the
"severity" of any burden imposed by the ID requirement "is, of
course, mitigated" by the provisional ballot provision. 47 In short,
Crawford can (but need not) be read to suggest that, to prevail,
voters would need to show that a challenged electoral restriction
left them wholly unable to vote. 48
In Frank v. Walker, 49 Judge Easterbrook read Crawford to
immunize ID measures so long as they did not render voters
wholly unable to vote. He then found that the record in
Wisconsin failed to show any voters for whom the ID measure
proved to be an absolute bar to participation. 50 The Wisconsin
law made voting more difficult for some voters, but, Judge
Easterbrook emphasized, the Indiana law had facially done so as

45

Id. at 187, 201.
Crawford, 533 U.S. at 187, 201-02 (noting testimony from some witnesses, "none
of whom expressed a personal inability to vote under SEA 483," from others who were
still seeking to comply, from another who suggested he was "both" unwilling and unable
to comply, and an affidavit from "one homeless woman who ... was denied a photo
identification card because she did not have an address;" and observing "that single
affidavit gives no indication of how common the problem is.").
47
Id. at 199.
48
See generally Ellen D. Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreat from
Election Law, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1615 (2009).
49
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
50
Id. at 746-47 (stating that trial court failed to identify "substantial numbers" of
eligible voters who "tried to get a photo ID but [were] unable to do so;" that eight voters
testified to various frustrating attempts, but "they did not testify that they had tried to
get (birth certificates], let alone that they had tried but failed;" and that extensive
findings "that the poor are less likely to have photo IDs than persons of average income"
mirrored findings in Crawford that were "deemed ... an inadequate basis for holding
Indiana's law unconstitutional").
46
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well. 51 Finding the Wisconsin and Indiana voter ID measures to
be structurally similar in relevant respects, he concluded that
Crawford "require[s] us to reject a constitutional challenge to
Wisconsin's statute."52
Judge Posner's subsequent dissent insisted the Wisconsin
record made the showing Judge Easterbrook read Crawford to
require plaintiffs to make; namely, it identified voters wholly
unable to vote due to the voter ID measure. 53 Judge Posner,
however, did not think the invalidity of the Wisconsin statute
hinged on such evidence. Crawford was distinguishable not
simply because "not a single plaintiff" in that case "intend[ed]
not to vote because of the new law" or "whom the law will deter
from voting." 54 As important was the fact that the Indiana
measure was "less restrictive" 55 in critical respects and hence
less burdensome on voters. Judge Posner wrote, "Crawford ...
does not resolve the present case, which involves a different
statute and has a different record and arises against
a background of a changed political culture in the
United States."56
All the courts that have ruled for the voting plaintiffs postShelby County have agreed. For instance, the Sixth Circuit held

51

Id. at 746.
Id. at 751.
53
Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(noting that "eight persons testified that they want to vote ... but have been unable to
obtain the required identification" and describing a voter unable to obtain a photo ID,
"who voted in previous elections but will be unable to vote in the forthcoming November
4 election" and "similar" testimony from other witnesses); see also Frank v. Walker, 17 F.
Supp. at 854, 862 (describing testimony from "eight witnesses who intend to vote in
Wisconsin elections but who do not currently possess a qualifying photo ID;" and
refusing to stay order because "some of the named individual plaintiffs ... would be
unable to vote during any election that occurred while the stay was in effect, as they lack
a photo ID and have been unable to obtain a photo ID"); Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d at
744, cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3615 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2015) (No. 14-803).
54
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951-52 (7th Cir. 2007).
55
Frank, 773 F.3d at 783-85 (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that Indiana accepted
more varieties of identification, allowed voters to vote absentee without submitting any
identification at all, and provided a means for indigent voters to submit affidavits
"confirming their identity and indigence" rather than requiring them to obtain the
necessary identification documents).
56
Id. at 792 (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating that obtaining photo ID may involve
"significant" rather than "negligible" costs and noting "[t]o encounter 'obstacles that have
prevented or deterred' persons from obtaining a photo ID means either having tried but
failed to obtain a photo ID or having realized that (for these persons) the obstacles to
obtaining it were insurmountable, so there would be no point in trying to overcome
them").
52
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that plaintiffs did not need to present "proof that there was no
possibility [they] would find a way to adjust and vote through
the remaining options."5 7 Similarly, the district court in Veasey
v. Perry 58 observed that "Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that
any particular voter absolutely cannot get the necessary ID or
vote by absentee ballot under SB 14," but made clear that "such
an extreme burden is not necessary." 59
Whether the Supreme Court agrees is uncertain, as it
declined review in Frank v. Walker. 60 What is clear is that Judge
Easterbrook's approach rests on a distinction-between
regulations that burden a right and those that completely deny
it-that finds no parallel in the marriage cases leading to
Obergefell. Some courts characterized same-sex marriage bans
as barring entirely the right to marry, 61 but the success of the
marriage plaintiffs after Windsor never hinged on whether bans
on same-sex marriage were better understood to deny the right
completely or instead to burden it significantly. 62 Indeed, bans
on same-sex marriage did not deny same-sex couples all the
benefits of marriage, at least in jurisdictions that authorize civil
unions or domestic partnerships. 63 These arrangements were
57
See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 543-44 (6th Cir.
2014); see also Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 434 F.Supp.3d 808, 840-41
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (holding inability to predict whether reduction in EIP voting period
"will actually reduce voter turnout . . . is not determinative of the Equal Protection
analysis. Rather, the question is whether a burden has been imposed on the
fundamental right to vote").
58
Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9,
2014).
59
See id. at *43.
60
Frank v. Walker, No. 14-803, 2015 WL 131119, at *l (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015).
61
See, e.g., Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1081 (10th Cir. 2014) ("Oklahoma has
barred all same-sex couples ... from the benefits of marriage"); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760
F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) (Virginia's marriage laws "prevent same-sex couples from
marrying" and "exclude[e] same-sex couples from marriage"); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456, 478 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Idaho and Nevada's marriage laws ... preventO same-sex
couples from marrying"); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472 (E.D. Va. 2014)
("[U]nder Virginia's Marriage Laws, Plaintiffs and Virginia citizens similar to Plaintiffs
are deprived of that right to marry.").
62
See, e.g., Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1080 ("State bans on the licensing of same-sex
marriage significantly burden the fundamental right to marry."); Schaefer, 760 F.3d at
377, 384 (alternatively describing same-sex marriage ban to "prevent same sex couples
from marriage, to '"significantly interfere' with a fundamental right" and to "impede the
right to marry").
63
See, e.g., Latta, 771 F.3d at 467 (Domestic partners are "like married couples for
purposes of rights and responsibilities, including with respect to children, under state
law"). Compare Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1001 (D. Nev. 2012), rev'd and
remanded sub nom, with Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Except as
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nevertheless held insufficient to alleviate the burden same-sex
marriage bans impose.

B.

Supporting State Interests and the Relevance of Evidence

Like the marriage plaintiffs, the voting plaintiffs have
argued that the interests that States offer to justify the
challenged regulations are insufficiently weighty and poorly
advanced by the regulations at issue. They have secured a
number of favorable rulings on point, but all have been stayed or
reversed, and, here too, the merits' reversal deemed the state
interests at issue adequate. 64 The voting plaintiffs have run into
resistance when presenting evidence that undermines the state
interests offered to justify challenged electoral restrictions. The
marriage plaintiffs, by contrast, successfully undercut state
justifications by either presenting evidence running counter to
them or emphasizing the absence of evidence that supports
them.65 This absence of supporting evidence not only diminished
the asserted state interests but also contributed to more
rigorous review of the burden same-sex marriage bans imposed
and the motivation behind their enactment.
After Windsor, courts were notably unimpressed with the
interests states claim same-sex marriage bans advanced. They
rejected the idea that same-sex marriage bans protect
procreative marriage as "grossly over- and under-inclusive;" 66
they dismissed as "wholly illogical" the idea that permitting
same-sex marriage destabilizes or otherwise damages

otherwise provided in the statutes, domestic partners in Nevada have the same rights
and responsibilities as spouses have."); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir.
2014) (domestic partnerships provide "some spousal benefits" but not "the right to adopt
children jointly; spousal·support obligations, the presumption that all property of
married couples is marital property; and state-mandated access to enrollment in a
spouse's health insurance plan").
64
See infra notes 84 & 89-90 and accompanying text.
65
See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
66
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 661, 672 (discussing why reliance on traditional marriage to
"channel[ ] procreative sex" is both over and under inclusive); Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1080
(rejecting "arguments based on the procreative capacity of some opposite-sex couples" on
narrow tailoring grounds); Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 383, 384 ("[E]xclud[ing] same-sex
couples from marriage due to their inability to have unintended children makes little
sense."); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1221 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[A]ppellants cannot
assert procreative potential as a basis to deny marriage rights to same-sex couples.");
Latta, 771 F.3d at 472 ("[S]tates give marriage licenses to many opposite-sex couples who
cannot or will not reproduce ... but not to same-sex couples who already have children
or are in the process of having or adopting them.").
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"traditional" marriage; 67 and they discarded as flatly
impermissible the preference that children grow up in families
headed by a female parent and a male parent. 68 They turned
back state pleas for more time to assess whether same-sex
marriage might yield negative effects, finding an absence of such
effects in states that have legalized the practice as sufficient
grounds to reject a wait-and-see approach. 69 And they denied the
State's interest in regulating marriage pursuant to popular or
majority-held values, when they have understood that interest
as failing to protect minority rights. 10
In the voting cases, States have argued primarily that
challenged electoral restrictions are needed to prevent voter
fraud and to foster voter confidence in the electoral system. In
Crawford, the Supreme Court held these interests to be
sufficient to support the imposition of voter ID, despite the
absence of evidence that either in-person voter fraud had
occurred in the jurisdiction or that the measure actually fostered
confidence or participation. 71

67

See Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1223 ("[I]t is wholly illogical to believe that state
recognition of the Jove and commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most
intimate and personal decisions of opposite-sex couples"); Latta, 771 F.3d at 476 (noting
that "[w]hen same-sex couples are married, just as when opposite-sex couples are
married, they serve as models of loving commitment to all"); see also DeBoer v. Snyder,
973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2014) ("[T]radition and morality are not rational
bases for the [Michigan Marriage Act].").
68
Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 384 (rejecting "optimal childrearing argument" as
overbroad, and lacking "congruity"); Latta, 771 F.3d at 4 71 (calling this rationale "a
categorically inadequate justification for discrimination"); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp.
2d 632, 653-54 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (rationale "presumes that same-sex couples cannot be
good parents-this is the same type of unconstitutional and unfounded presumption that
the Supreme Court has held 'cannot stand"'); see also DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388,
404-05 (6th Cir. 2014) (observing that "gay couples, no less than straight couples, are
capable of raising children and providing stable families for them").
69
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 668 (finding no basis to think that "heterosexual" marriage"
has been "transformed" in Massachusetts where same-sex marriage had long been legal).
70
Latta, 771 F.3d at 474 (noting need to "protect minorities from oppression by
majorities"); Baskin, 766 F.3d at 671 (stating that "[m]inorities trampled on by the
democratic process have recourse to the courts; the recourse is called constitutional
law"); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, No. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014 WL 6680570,
at *32 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 2014) ("Edith Windsor was not told to send a strongly worded
letter to her Congressman."). But see DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 406 (holding that the issue
should be resolved by the political process).
71
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196-97 (2008) (''The record
contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its
history."); see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (observing that "[v]oters who
fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel
disenfranchised").
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Several lower courts have nevertheless demanded
supporting evidence for both claims. For instance, the district
court in Frank u. Walker gave the State's interest in preventing
voter fraud "very little weight," because "voter-impersonation
fraud does not occur in Wisconsin," was only "theoretically
imaginable," and, thus, was "unlikely ... [to] become a problem
in Wisconsin in the foreseeable future." 72 Similarly, in Veasey u.
Perry, the district court found that instances of in-person voting
fraud were rare in Texas and that the State's ID measure was so
ill-suited to preventing such fraud that the court disputed the
State's claim that concerns about fraud actually motivated
the measure. 73
Likewise, in Ohio State Conference of NAACP. u. Husted, 74
the district court doubted Ohio's claim that reduced
opportunities for early in person (EIP) voting and the
elimination of "golden week" advanced the State's interest in
fraud prevention. 75 An earlier registration period, the court
observed, would provide the State the time it said it needed to
verify registrations, while eliminating additional days for EIP
"does not withstand logical scrutiny." 76 And an appellate court
rejected North Carolina's contention (and the district court's
finding) that the elimination of same day registration (SDR) was
necessary to promote electoral integrity and prevent fraud,
finding "nothing in the district court's portrayal of the facts
72
Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 847-48, 850, 852 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (stating
that "a person would have to be insane to commit voter-impersonation fraud" given the
penalties that could result and the unclear benefits that could be achieved, and finding
neither evidence nor plausible reason why the contested measure might block illegal
voting by felons and noncitizens).
73
Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *53, *55 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
9, 2014) (noting that state legislature opted not to mitigate measure's effect on specific
voters and racial minorities, despite ability to do so without hindering the measure's
anti-fraud rationale, and that "[d]efendants did not provide evidence that the
discriminatory features of SB 14 were necessary to accomplish any fraud-prevention
effort" or that they led "to any increased voter confidence or voter turnout"); see also
Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that Texas
"did not begin" to show that aspects of the measure that disproportionately burdened
minority voters were "necessary to prevent fraud or increase public confidence in the
electoral process").
74
Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808, 844 (S.D. Ohio
2014).
75
See id.
76
See id. ("[T]he potential for fraud identified ... exists whether voters are allowed
to register and vote on the same day or not, and is best combatted by election officials
following the law and applicable procedures and not counting absentee votes prior to the
proper verification of registration.").
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suggests that those are anything other than merely
imaginable." 77 Invoking the district court's decision in Frank u.
Walker, 78 the appellate court held that "states cannot burden the
right to vote in order to address dangers that are remote and
only 'theoretically imaginable.'"79
Lower courts have also disputed state claims that
challenged electoral restrictions foster voter confidence and
participation. In Frank, the district court cited survey data
collected soon after Crawford that suggested that voter ID
measures do not contribute to either voter confidence or voter
participation. 80 Noting an absence of contrary evidence in
Wisconsin, the court held that the State's voter ID measure
"does not further the State's interest in promoting confidence in
the electoral process" and might, in fact, "undermine the public's
confidence in the electoral process" by keeping eligible voters
from voting and thus making electoral results less reflective of
the will of the people.s1
The district court in Veasey likewise noted that "nothing in
the evidence linked ... SB 14 with voter confidence," and
suggested the measure "would likely decrease voter confidence"
by preventing "fully qualified, registered voters" from voting in
person and either "relegat[ing them] to the less reliable mail-in
ballot" or preventing them from voting entirely. The court held
that the "state interest in running elections in a manner that
instills confidence ... is not served by the overly strict terms of
SB 14."82

77

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 246 (4th Cir.

2014).
78

Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 246 (quoting Frank, 17 F.Supp.3d at
850 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968))).
80
See Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d. at 834; see also Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel
Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the
Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1760 (2008)
("This lack of empirical support leads us to conclude that, at least in the context of
current American election practices and procedures, public perceptions do not provide a
firm justification for voter identification laws.").
81
Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d. at 852.
82
Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *47 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9,
2014); see also Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[t]he greatest threat to public confidence in elections in this case is the prospect of
enforcing a purposefully discriminatory law, one that likely imposes an unconstitutional
poll tax and risks denying the right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters").
79
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The appellate court in Frank nevertheless concluded that,
under Crawford, the state interests in preventing voter fraud
and fostering voter confidence sufficed to justify Wisconsin's
voter ID measure. While "voter impersonation is rare if not
nonexistent," Judge Easterbrook noted that the absence of fraud
did not undermine the anti-fraud rationale in Crawford, and
hence concluded it should not in other cases either. 83 The court,
moreover, characterized the maintenance of voter confidence as
a "legislative fact" that lower courts could not revisit after
Crawford, notwithstanding either an absence of supporting
evidence or the existence of empirical evidence to the contrary. 84
Judge Posner disagreed. 85 He had previously observed that
"voting fraud impairs the rights of legitimate voters,''86 but by
Frank was no longer convinced that it did. Judge Posner wrote
that the absence of evidence showing in-person voting fraud to
be a problem meant that the prevention of such fraud neither
justified nor motivated the disputed measure. 87 He likewise
noted evidence that voter ID does not promote voter confidence,
adding that, even had polling data suggested otherwise, "it
would imply a massive public misunderstanding, since requiring
a photo ID in order to be permitted to vote appears to have no
effect on election fraud."88

83
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (making this claim and adding
that a photo ID requirement "deters fraud (so that a low frequency stays low)" and
promotes other interests); see also Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, No. 2:13-cv-224 at 14
(E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 2014), available at http: //www.scribd.com/doc/208815196/TNOpinion-on-Voter-ID, archived at http://perma.cc/E5EU-8ZRH ("Plaintiff's allegations of
Tennessee's lack of empirical evidence of in-person fraud or that requiring photo
identification will reduce it are irrelevant.").
84
Frank, 768 F.3d at 749-50 (arguing that better record-keeping, like voter
confidence, were not issues open to reconsideration after Crawford-''in our hierarchical
judicial system a district court cannot declare a statute unconstitutional just because he
thinks (with or without the support of a political scientist) that the dissent was right and
the majority wrong").
85
Frank, 773 F.3d at 795, 784-85 (Posner, J., dissenting).
88
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951-52 (7th Cir. 2007).
87
Frank, 773 F.3d at 796 (Posner, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the quest for
partisan advantage best explained the measure).
88
See id. at 794-95 (noting that the Ansolabehere and Persily article showed that
"perceptions of voter impersonation fraud are unrelated to the strictness of a state's
voter ID law" and that therefore, "[i]f perceptions of the prevalence of voterimpersonation fraud are unaffected by the strictness of a state's photo ID laws, neither
will confidence in the honesty of elections rise, for it would rise only if voters were
persuaded that such laws reduce the incidence of such fraud").
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Here, too, the Supreme Court's view is uncertain. Back in
Crawford, the Justices found the State's interest in preventing
voter fraud and fostering voter confidence sufficient to uphold a
voter ID measure on its face in a case that presented no evidence
of a fraud problem that demanded a solution or empirics to
support the causal claim asserted between voter ID and voter
confidence. 8 9 Still, Justice Stevens's plurality opinion found the
record in the case wanting in numerous respects and new or
additional evidence might illuminate not simply the burden
plaintiffs alleged but the nature of state interests asserted. The
denial of review in Frank leaves this question unresolved. 90
What is clear is that the Court left standing an appellate
opinion that upholds state interests with willful blindness to the
evidence undermining these interests. That stance, and the
support Crawford offers for it, contrasts with the approach
taken in the marriage cases, in which proffered state interests
largely collapsed under examination in most lower courts that
reviewed the issue. These interests have collapsed, moreover,
not simply as a derivative consequence of judicial findings that
same-sex marriage bans burden the right to marry, but instead
as standalone findings that themselves contributed to the
analysis of the burden imposed. In other words, the absence of
evidence supporting the state interests in the marriage cases
illuminated not only the weakness of the state interests
asserted, but also propelled more searching analysis of the
burden imposed by the bans and the motivation behind them.
The voting plaintiffs have similarly prevailed when lower
courts have been willing to probe the state interests asserted in
defense of challenged electoral regulations and treat the absence
of supporting evidence for them as probative. Judges who did so
concluded that this lack of empirical support rendered the state
interests themselves insubstantial, a finding that buttressed
and propelled their conviction that the burden imposed was
consequential
and
the
motivation
underlying
the
regulation suspect.
None of these voting decisions are presently in effect. Much
like the distinction between complete bans and significant
burdens on a fundamental right, empirical support (or the lack

89

90

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194-97 (2008).
Frank v. Walker, No. 14-803, 2015 WL 131119, at *1 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2015).
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thereof) is playing a different role in the voting disputes than it
played in the marriage cases.

II.

DEFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

After Windsor, courts examined same-sex marriage bans
with considerable rigor. They viewed the burden imposed to be
significant, notwithstanding the availability of civil unions and
domestic partnerships, and they have refused, in the main, to
defer to state interests offered in defense of the bans, deeming
either the absence of supporting evidence or the existence of
contrary evidence fatal to the validity of the state interests
invoked. By contrast, what appears to be the dominant approach
in the voting cases accords far more deference to state action.
Alleged burdens dissipate in light of either the prospect of
participation or the availability of other, less desirable
mechanisms to cast a ballot; state interests, meanwhile,
withstand scrutiny in the absence of empirical grounding and
even in the face of undermining evidence.
This variation in deference may stem from the belief that
bans on same-sex marriage involved a more troublesome sort of
discrimination. 91 Animus was widely seen to underlie same-sex
marriage bans, while more calculated, instrumental goals are
thought to propel the voting restrictions. Less deference may
have been accorded in the marriage cases because animus-based
discrimination is seen to be the more severe form of
discrimination. This Part first describes and then challenges
this claim.

91

Seven years ago, Judge Posner suggested that deferential review of voter ID was
appropriate because the dispute was one in which "the right to vote is on both sides of
the ledger." Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007)
(2008) (stating that "voting fraud impairs the rights of legitimate voters to vote by
diluting their votes"). That idea was always controversial, and by Frank, Judge Posner
was no longer convinced by it. See Frank, 773 F.3d at 792, 796 (Posner, J., dissenting)
(disputing notion that voter ID measures advance voting rights). The ledger image fails
to explain the lesser deference accorded in the marriage cases, given that fundamental
rights are as readily apparent on "both sides of the ledger" in those cases as they ever
were in the voting arena. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing state
claim that same-sex marriage bans are necessary to protect the integrity of traditional
marriage).
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Gradations of Discriminatory Intent

The marriage plaintiffs could have displaced same-sex
marriage bans without presenting any evidence that the state
officials involved acted with discriminatory intent; similarly, the
voting
plaintiffs
could
prevail
without
establishing
discriminatory intent. 92 In both contexts, however, the plaintiffs
have pressed the claim that discriminatory intent propelled the
regulations they challenge. As discussed below, various
marriage decisions that reached the issue explicitly found
animus, while the sole voting decision that found discriminatory
intent did not.
In the marriage cases, courts addressing the issue of
discriminatory intent repeatedly found that same-sex marriage
bans were motivated by animus. 93 These decisions noted, inter
alia, that "this law is motivated by animus;" 94 that it has no
purpose "other than to effect pure animus;" 95 that these laws
"single out" same-sex couples for disfavored treatment; 96 that
"disparagement of. . . sexual orientation" is "implicit in the
denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples," 97 and that
withholding the term "marriage" had "no justification other than
bigotry." 98 The "clear primary purpose and practical effect of the
marriage bans ... [is] to disparage and demean the dignity of
same-sex couples in the eyes of the State and the
wider community."99
92 Proof of such intent is not an essential element of the VRA Section 2 injury, see 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (proscribing conduct that "results" in a denial or abridgment of the right to
vote); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986), nor is it necessary to establish a
Fourteenth Amendment injury grounded either in the deprivation of a fundamental
right, see, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967), or an irrational state action. See e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1207, 1215 (D. Utah 2013) (finding marriage law invalid under rational basis
review).
93
But see Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J.,
concurring) (citing "considerations [that] cut strongly against a finding of animus");
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (declining to ascribe
animus as the motivation of the "the approximately 2. 7 million voters who approved the
measure").
94
Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1163 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
95
De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646, 662-63 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
96
See, e.g., Baskin, 12 F. Supp. 3d at 1163; Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 2014
WL 6680570, at *34 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 25 2015).
97
See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014).
98
See id. at 670.
99
See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 995 (S.D. Ohio 2013); see also
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Compare this narrative to the account of state action in the
sole voting dispute to produce a finding of intentional race
discrimination. In Veasey, ' 00 Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos found
that Texas's voter ID provision, while facially neutral as to race,
disproportionately burdened African-American and Hispanic
voters and that this racially disparate impact was the ''but-for"
reason the State adopted the measure. ' 0 ' Applying the Village of
Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan Housing Development
framework
for
determining
whether
Corporation 102
discriminatory intent is a motivating factor for a facially neutral
law, 103 Judge Ramos noted the irregular process by which the
State adopted the measure; the legislature's awareness of SB14's racially disparate impact; and, most critically, the
legislature's decision to reject amendments that would have
mitigated that impact without hindering advancement of the
fraud prevention goals SB-14 purported to promote. 104 Judge
Ramos concluded that the evidence "demonstrates that
proponents of SB 14 within the 82nd Texas Legislature were
motivated, at the very least in part, because of and not merely in
spite of the voter ID law's detrimental effects on the AfricanAmerican and Hispanic electorate." 105
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014) ("The official message of support ... in
favor of opposite-sex marriage ... necessarily serves to convey a message of disfavor
towards same-sex couples and their families."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456,
481 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding basis to suspect prejudice and finding that "moral
condemnation" of homosexuality "continues to manifest in Virginia in state-sanctioned
activities" ); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044-45 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Latta v.
Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1080 (D. Idaho 2014) (finding that "moral disapproval of
homosexuality was an underlying, animating factor" for same-sex marriage ban).
Some judges and commentators have argued that it is unnecessary and even "unwise" to
resolve allegations of discriminatory intent in the marriage cases, given the speed at
which views on same-sex marriage have evolved, the damage caused by accusations of
bigotry, and the difficulties that inhere in assessing voter intent. See, e.g., Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 2014) (Holmes, J., concurring); Wolf v. Walker,
986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1009 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128,
1140-41, 1146-47 (D. Or. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1236 (10th Cir.
2014) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Steven G. Calabresi, Daniel 0. Conkle, Michael J. Perry, & Brett G. Scharffs In Support
of Certiorari and Opposing a Ruling Based on Voters' Motivations at 5-6, 11, Herbert v.
Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (No.14-124).
00
'
Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WO 5090258 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2014).
101
Id. at *48, *56, *58.
102
See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
103
See id. at 265; see also Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
104
Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d, at 699-703.
105
Id. at *703; see also Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 11-12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (Texas "did not begin to demonstrate that the Bill's discriminatory features
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Judge Ramos went on to explain why the Texas Legislature
designed its voter ID measure to burden African-American and
Latino voters. The opinion states that lawmakers recognized
that "Republicans in Texas ... facing a declining voter base ...
[could] gain partisan advantage by suppressing the
overwhelmingly Democratic votes of African-Americans and
Latinos." 106 Judge Ramos accordingly credited evidence that
documented "intentional discrimination against minorities to
achieve a partisan political advantage."107
Notice that this finding of intentional racial discrimination
never mentions "animus" or "bigotry." One can debate whether
those terms might appropriately be used to describe official
conduct that seeks to burden a racially-defined group because of
its partisan affiliation. 108 But Judge Ramos decidedly avoided
that characterization. (Judge Posner also avoided these terms,
when, in Frank, he offered a similar explanation for the
proliferation of measures like voter ID.) 109 For Judge Ramos, the
were necessary" and that "[o]n this plain evidence, the District Court concluded that the
Bill would not have been enacted absent its racially disparate effects").
106
Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d, at 700.
107
Id. at 658.
108
There is also debate among some commentators as to whether partisan-infused
electoral restrictions should be categorized to involve racial discrimination at all. See,
e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1394 (2015) (suggesting that
"the category of race increasingly fails to capture the primary motivation for what has
become a battlefield in partisan wars"). These commentators urge what my colleague
Sam Bagenstos describes to be a "universalist" approach to voting rights, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby),
123 YALE L.J. 2838 (2014), namely, one that focuses on the ways a disputed regulation
may burden the right to vote rather than on the group or groups who are burdened by it.
The idea is that voting claims grounded in universal terms are more likely to succeed,
better promote core values, and thus serve more voters more effectively than more
conventional civil rights terms. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination
Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 121-23 (2013); Richard H. Pildes, Room for
Debate: We Need a Broader Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/24/is-the-voting-rights-act-stillneeded/we-need-a-broader-approach, archived at http://perma.cc/JU5W-JFEU; Richard
L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make it
Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. 58, 58 n.2 (2014); see
also Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 701 (2006). Shaped by both strategic and normative
considerations, the universalist's position does not-on my reading at least-insist that
courts err when, as Judge Ramos did, they find racial discrimination under the Arlington
Heights framework.
109
Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting).
(observing that "a number of conservative states try to make it difficult for people who
are outside the mainstream, whether because of poverty or race or problems with the
English language, or who are unlikely to have a driver's license or feel comfortable
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state action at issue stemmed from intentional racial
discrimination, regardless of whether animus in the form of illwill toward African-American and Latino voters propelled the
legislature to enact the voter ID measure that it did. In her
view, a plan to burden a racial group for partisan gain sufficed.
This account of state action differs from what was the
prevailing narrative in the marriage cases that addressed
intent. Both identify state action crafted to burden members of a
defined group, 110 and both categorize such action as intentionally
discriminatory, but offer distinct reasons for why the state
actors imposed the burdens at issue. Where Judge Ramos
identified intentionally discriminatory conduct calculated to
advance partisan goals, the marriage decisions identified similar
conduct motivated by ammus and crafted to express
that animus.

B.

Circumscribing Discrimination

The line separating animus-based discrimination from the
more calculated, instrumental discrimination Judge Ramos
identified should be a distinction without a difference. Both
types of intent capture state action crafted to impose significant
and selective burdens on specific minority groups. Both operate
inexorably as sources of long-term structural harm. Both are
recent, but far from novel, manifestations of a long tradition of
intentionally discriminatory state action motivated by animus,
by partisan or otherwise strategic goals, and often by both. rn
Gauging the relative damage caused by one or the other is a
fraught, ahistorical and unproductive endeavor from which legal
consequences ought not to follow.

dealing with officialdom, to vote ... because if they do vote they are likely to vote for
Democratic candidates").
110
Both accordingly differ from the longstanding, now discredited category of
"benign" discrimination intended to benefit group members. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989); United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 175 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
111
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 23~5 (1st ed.
1974); see also Cary Franklin, Discriminatory Animus, in A Nation of Widening
Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50 (forthcoming Michigan Univ. Press);
Issacharoff, supra note 107, at 1394 ("Black voting rights were antithetical to the status
quo based on Jim Crow, but for more than one reason.").
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And yet, the sense that animus-based discrimination is
more damaging than more calculated discrimination may best
explain why courts were more inclined to side with the marriage
plaintiffs than they have been with the voting plaintiffs. When
animus is suspected or explicitly found, as it was in the
marriage cases, courts do not defer to state action even on issues
unrelated to intent. Challenged regulations were seen to burden
a fundamental right and state interests offered in support were
deemed inadequate. More mixed results follow when animus is
not understood to underlie the challenged state conduct.
Deference to state action becomes more likely, the burdens
challenged regulations impose tend to be minimized, and the
state interests offered validated.
This privileging of animus-based discrimination over other
types of intentional discrimination may help explain why Judge
Ramos' ruling-the sole finding to date of racially discriminatory
intent in the post-Shelby County voting litigation-was quickly
rendered inoperative by the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme
Court. 112 Judicial willingness to allow implementation of a state
law adjudicated to be the product of intentional racial
discrimination was met with some surprise; 113 and yet, a good
deal of intentionally discriminatory conduct had been allowed to
proceed without remedy in recent years. 114
Shelby County itself captures this stance and the
accompanying judgment that not all conduct falling within the
category of discriminatory intent is equally culpable. That
decision left a key provision of the VRA inoperative, based, in
part, on the finding that the discrimination documented in the
2006 congressional record reauthorizing it was not as severe as
the discrimination that first led Congress to enact the VRA. 11 5

112
See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 895 (5th
Cir. 2014).
113
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Dawn Patrol, SLATE (Oct. 19. 2014), available at
http://www.slate.com/ articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/ginsburg_s_disse
nt_in_texas_voter_id_la w_supreme_court_order.html ?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw_top, archived
at http://perma.cc/JXJ3-Q29Y (''It appears to be unprecedented to let a law that was
deemed racially discriminatory go into effect simply to avoid the risk of voter confusion
and election administration inefficiency.").
114
See Ellen D. Katz, Justice Ginsburg's Umbrella, in A Nation of Widening
Opportunities: The Civil Rights Act at 50 (forthcoming Michigan Univ. Press).
115
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (noting the record evidence
did not "showO anything approaching the 'pervasive,' 'flagrant,' 'widespread,' and
'rampant' discrimination that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the
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Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion, however did not
dispute Justice Ginsburg's observation, made in dissent, that
the
record
documented
persistent
and
prevalent
116
unconstitutional discrimination.
By immobilizing the
statutory regime in the face of that recognized discrimination,
Shelby County endorsed a distinction between overt
discrimination of the extreme Jim Crow variety and the less
brazen defiance of constitutional norms we see today.
The voting and marriage cases decided after Windsor and
Shelby County and before Obergefell suggest a similar
distinction between types of intentional discrimination. By
applying more rigorous review to state action when animus is
suspected or identified, these decisions isolated animus-based
discrimination for distinct condemnation and intimated that the
more calculated discrimination of the sort Judge Ramos
identified might not be cause for concern.
As such, the decisions threaten a deeply consequential
narrowing of actionable discrimination. The animus-based
discrimination identified in the marriage cases between Windsor
and Obergefell is increasingly scarce in arenas in which civil
rights protections have been accorded for longer periods. Indeed,
it is far from happenstance that same-sex marriage bans were
analogized to the Jim Crow-era anti-miscegenation laws
ultimately struck down in Loving v. Virginia. 117 The fight for
marriage equality was said to resemble the early civil rights
struggle against racial discrimination, 118 and the understanding
covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time").
116
See id. at 2639-43, 2646-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117
See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 670 (7th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert,
961 F. Supp. 2d. 1181, 1215 (D. Utah 2013) (finding State's arguments supporting samesex marriage ban to be "almost identical" to those made by Virginia in 1966 to defend
interracial marriage ban and finding them "as unpersuasive as the Supreme Court found
them fifty years ago"); Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1027-28 (W.D. Wis. 2014)
(rejecting as inadequate the prospect that voters might repeal same-sex marriage, noting
that same prospect existed with regard to anti-miscegenation laws, and concluding that
"a district court may not abstain from deciding a case because of a possibility that the
issues raised in the case could be resolved in some other way at some other time").
118
See Steven G. Calabresi, Gay Marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment,
Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 14-51 (2013), at 16, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509443, archived at http://perma.cc/C25M-GE52 (observing
that "(s]tate laws that ban same sex marriage formally discriminate on the basis of sex
in the same way that State laws that banned inter-racial marriage discriminated on the
basis of race"); see also Campbell Robertson & Shaila Dewan, In Defiance on Gay
Marriage, Alabama Sets Itself Far Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2015), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/11/us/in-defiance-alabama-sets-itself-far-apart.html,
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of same-sex marriage bans as explicit, animus-based
discrimination comports with that view.
But animus of the Jim Crow sort captures only a portion of
the conduct long understood to fall within the category of
intentional discrimination.11 9 The suggestion that animus might
define the category in its entirety is a new idea that caricatures
historical practice and ignores the nature of the discriminatory
practices that gave rise to modern civil rights laws in the first
instance. In practice, it portends repudiation of the Arlington
Heights framework by relegating actionable discrimination to
what is regarded in the main as deviant behavior and
immunizing the types of structural inequality that make
calculated discrimination of the sort Judge Ramos identified
attractive to state actors.
III. DEFERENCE AND DIGNITY
The sense that animus-based discrimination is distinctly
culpable fuels the view that the marriage and voting cases are
categorically different. In so doing, it obscures a central
characteristic these cases may share. Bans on same-sex
marriage are now widely seen to have inflicted a dignitary harm
on same-sex couples. The voting restrictions challenged in the
post-Shelby County litigation might be similarly understood, but
that idea has yet to find application or even expression in the
voting disputes.
The idea of dignity pervaded arguments for same-sex
marriage. The marriage plaintiffs made clear they sought not
only the tangible benefits of marriage but "equal dignity for
their marital aspirations." 120 Windsor observed that marriage
archived at http://perma.cc/9GJ6-BFEV (linking state Chief Justice's resistance to
federal court order on same-sex marriage to George Wallace's infamous stand in the
schoolhouse door opposing integration).
119
See also Franklin, supra note 111 (criticizing use of Title VII "as a mechanism for
policing outliers" and seeking "to engage in a new conversation--or really, reinvigorate
an older conversation-about what constitutes discrimination under the law").
120
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Bostic
v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 368 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting plaintiffs' claim that "the 'inability
to marry or have their relationship recognized ... with the dignity and respect accorded
to married opposite-sex couples has caused them significant hardship"'); Bishop v. Smith,
760 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 2014) (plaintiffs "feel ... that marriage conveys a
'level of commitment or respect' that is not otherwise available . . . [and] that their
inability to marry under Oklahoma law is 'demeaning' and 'signals to others that they
should not respect our relationship."'); DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 417 (6th Cir.
2014) ("While these cases present a denial of access to many benefits, what is '[o]f
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confers "a dignity and status of immense import," 121 and lower
courts after Windsor repeatedly identified same-sex marriage
bans to inflict dignitary harm on same-sex couples. 122 They, for
instance, found that same-sex marriage bans "disparage[d] and
demean[ed] the dignity of same-sex couples in the eyes of the
State and the wider community;" 123 they denied the children of
same-sex couples "the recognition essential to ... dignity" and
thereby prevented "those children from being recognized as
members of a family by their peers;" 124 they denied from samesex couples "respectability," labeled their families "as secondclass;" and "materially harm[ed] and demean[ed] same-sex
couples and their children." 125 The bans "humiliate[ed]" 126 and
prevented same-sex couples "from participating fully in our
society." 121 These injuries stemmed not from the denial of the
tangible benefits marriage provides (and that a civil union or
domestic partnership regime might offer) and arose instead
because same-sex marriage bans denied same-sex couples the
right "to publicly solemnize" 128 their relationship in the way
opposite-sex couples were allowed to.129
greater importance' to the claimants, as they see it, 'is the loss of ... dignity and respect'
occasioned by these laws''); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.
14, 2014) ("[T)he plaintiffs aver as follows: ... 'that our family must suffer the indignity,
stress, and stigma of not knowing whether or when our marriage will be recognized."').
121
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
122
See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014) (providing equal
access to marriage will "demonstrate[e] that homosexual married couples are in essential
respects, notably in the care of their adopted children, like other married couples");
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1214 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[S]urely a great deal of the
dignity of same-sex relationships inheres in the loving bonds between those who seek to
marry and the personal autonomy of making such choices."); Henry v. Himes, 14 F.
Supp. 3d 1036, 1060 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (stating that ban on same-sex marriage deprives
"these families of . . [the] dignity that come with recognition of their marriages");
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 981-82 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (noting "the harm
Plaintiffs suffer when they lose ... the immensely important dignity, status, recognition,
and protection of lawful marriage"); cf. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 417 (6th Cir.
2014) (stating that "any loss of dignity and respect on this issue ... came from the
neighborhoods and communities in which gay and lesbian couples live, and in which it is
worth trying to correct the problem in the first instance").
123
Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
124
Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1215.
125
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 658; Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2014);
Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, No. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014 WL 6680570, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 2014).
126
Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478 (E.D. Va. 2014).
127
Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014).
128
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2014).
129
See, e.g., Schaefer, 760 F.3d at 377 ("[T)he choices that individuals make in the
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An analogous injury might be seen to follow from many of
the electoral restrictions challenged post-Shelby County. For
instance, voters lacking compliant ID under various state ID
measures need to "scrounge up a birth certificate," 130 make
repeated trips to varied municipal and state offices, take time off
from work, secure transportation, and pay consequential fees. 131
Some of these voters may ultimately succeed in casting a ballot,
but, to do so, they must first successfully perform a number of
burdensome tasks that voters who already possess compliant ID
for other purposes need not undertake, much less accomplish. As
Judge Ann Claire Williams stated in dissent in Frank v. Walker,
"the right to vote ... is not just held by those who have cars and
so already have driver's licenses and by those who travel and so
already have passports." 132 Put differently, ID requirements do
not simply make voting significantly more onerous for voters
lacking qualifying ID, but they make it arduous in ways voters
who already possess requisite ID for other purposes do
not experience. 133
It is in this sense that the injury that results from voter ID
laws resembles the dignity-based harm that same-sex marriage
bans are now understood to inflict. The analogy is far from
perfect, but it is sufficient to isolate an unexamined aspect of the
injury many of the post-Shelby County voting regulations cause.
Much like same-sex couples who were denied the ability to
context of same-sex relationships enjoy the same constitutional protection as the choices
accompanying opposite-sex relationships."); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30
(10th Cir. 2014) (noting "same sex [couples) are entitled to exercise the same
fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the
opposite sex"); Campaign for S. Equal., 2014 WL 6680570, at *14 (Banning same-sex
marriage "serves to undermine the dignity of gay and lesbian citizens by suggesting that
they are unworthy of sharing rights fundamental to every free person."); Wolf v. Walker,
986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 988 (W.D. Wis. June 13, 2014) (Invalidating same sex marriage ban
"merely affirm[s) that [same-sex] couples have rights to liberty and equality under the
Constitution, just as heterosexual couples do."); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456,
478 (E.D. Va. 2014) ("Plaintiffs honor, and yearn for, the sacred values and dignity that
other individuals celebrate when they enter into marital vows in Virginia, and they ask
to no longer be deprived of the opportunity to share these fundamental rights."); De Leon
v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 659 (W.D. Tex. 2014) ("By denying Plaintiffs Holmes and
Phariss the fundamental right to marry, Texas denies their relationship the same status
and dignity afforded to citizens who are permitted to marry.").
130
See Frank v. Walker, 769 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2014) (Williams, J., dissenting);
Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting).
131
See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *21, *48 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 9, 2014).
132
See Frank, 769 F.3d at 498 (Williams, J., dissenting).
133
See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 12 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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solemnize their relationship as opposite-sex couples do and the
public recognition that comes from doing so, 134 voters lacking
compliant ID are denied both the ability to "vote without
hindrance" 135 as other voters are allowed to do and the public
recognition that comes from the exercise of citizenship that
voting in this manner represents.
In both contexts, the resulting dignitary injury is premised
on the idea that dignity emerges from performative acts and the
recognition and respect law accords to them. 136 It is, thus, not
happenstance that the marriage plaintiffs tended to be in longterm, committed relationships, often raising children and
participating in various civic-minded projects. Nor is it an
accident that they challenged state laws that denied them the
public recognition marriage provides and that is accorded to
opposite-sex couples whether or not those couples presented
themselves as the plaintiffs do. 13 7 Similarly, the voting plaintiffs
are typically registered voters who have voted in numerous past
elections and who now confront new voter ID requirements (or
other measures) that transformed the act of participa6on into
an ordeal. Whether or not these voters ultimately succeed in
casting a ballot, they challenge electoral restrictions that impede
their participation and compromise the recognition that comes
from being able to cast a ballot unhindered as other voters
can do. 138
This dignitary harm, accordingly, is grounded more in
equality than in liberty. 139 In both the marriage and voting

134

See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014); Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968,
995 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
135
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 64 (1980).
136
See JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK & RIGHTS 22 (2015); Katherine Franke,
Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron's Dignity, Rights and Responsibilities,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1177, 1178 (2011).
137
See Franke, supra note 136, at 1197 (describing and evaluating how proponents
of marriage equality have "mounted a ritualized performance of responsibilized
citizenship . . . that [h]aving become recognizable as respectable, the court could
recognize them as dignified, rights-bearing subjects and equal in rank to other
(heterosexual) legal citizens").
138
See WALDRON, supra note 136, at 36 (observing that "although it is shared with
millions of others the vote is not a little thing. It too can be understood in a more
momentous way, as the entitlement of each person, as part of his or her dignity to an
(equal) peer of the realm, to be consulted in public affairs").
139
Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011)
(describing "liberty-based" and "equality-based" dignity claims).
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disputes, dignitary harm results from a selective denial of access
to an institution on the same terms that others are granted. 140
The injury derives from and builds upon the longstanding
recognition that a "deprivation of personal dignity ... surely
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments." 141
Without doubt, recognition of a dignitary interest in the
voting disputes presents difficulties not present in the marriage
cases. As Justice Scalia recognized in Crawford, electoral rules
necessarily "affectO different voters differently," 142 and elections
could hardly be run if every differential impact gave rise to a
cognizable dignitary harm, much less constitutional injury. Put
differently, the prospect that electoral restrictions might inflict
dignitary harms does not tell us which restrictions might do so
and which do not.
Developing a framework for such an inquiry lies beyond the
scope of this Article, 14s but some preliminary principles might
nevertheless be distilled. For instance, some electoral
regulations will not implicate dignity interests at all, either
because the burdens they impose are de minimus, or because the
issues they regulate do not themselves touch on dignitary
concerns. 144 Other regulations might implicate dignitary
interests but advance goals that warrant their implementation
despite the injuries they cause. Context is critical such that the
same rule might implicate dignity concerns in one jurisdiction
but not another. The failure, for instance, to provide early voting
140

As such, the interest differs from the dignitary harm some suggest follows from
facial race-based classifications. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499, 517 (2000)
(observing that "it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his own merit"); Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that state
mandated racial labels are inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society); see
also BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 230-49 (1976).
141
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964). For
recent disputes on public access and religious freedom, see, e.g., Daniel Roberts, Walmart
CEO to Arkansas Governor: Veto 'Religious Freedom' Legislation, FORTUNE, Mar. 31,
2015, available at http: //fortune.com/2015/03/31/walmart-ceo-asks-arkansas-governor-toveto-religion-legislation/, archived at http://perma.cc/P4GZ-9SJV; Walmart Newsroom,
Our Statement on Arkansas #HB1228, TWITTER, (Mar. 31, 2015, 5:26 PM),
https: //twitter.com/W almartNewsroom/status/583032659787 448320, archived at https: II
perma.cc/WT6B-GUL2.
142
See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
143
See Ellen D. Katz, Bringing Dignity (Back) to Voting (draft, on file with author).
144
See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding state ban on writein candidates).
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does not facially raise a concern grounded in dignity, and yet the
withdrawal of that option on terms that eliminate what was a
vibrant form of participation for distinct communities of voters
plausibly implicates a dignity interest. 145 So too, an ID rejected
because the voter "recently grew a beard" might be dismissed, as
Justice Stevens once suggested, as a minor inconvenience
"arising from life's vagaries," 146 but such rejection also might
inflict serious damage of a dignitary sort, for instance, to a
transitioning transgender voter.147
Context also helps illuminate the ways in which inequality
is manifest in the electoral arena, such that a rule's facial
neutrality should not obscure the dignitary harm it might
inflict. 148 Voter ID measures highlight this point but are just one
example. Long wait times to vote in some precincts but not
others raise concerns grounded in dignity, particularly when
basic services are denied along the way. 14 9
As has been widely observed, dignity is a particularly
malleable concept, 150 such that "very different outcomes are

145
See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 558-59 (6th Cir.
2014) (noting plaintiffs' evidence "that the eliminated EIP voting times are those that
African Americans disproportionately use, and that racial inequalities in socioeconomic
status and other factors make it much more difficult for African Americans to vote at the
remaining times or through the other methods now available under the status quo as
compared to other groups.") (emphasis in original); cf Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting
Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1865, 1879-80 (2013) ("While the cutback of voting on the last weekend would be sure to
inconvenience some voters and to put a kink in get-out-the-vote strategies, the move did
not appear to be disenfranchising.").
146
See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion).
147
See, e.g., Veasey v. Perry, No. 13-CV-00193, 2014 WL 5090258, at *33 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 9, 2014) ("Mr. Ozias, who is in the process of changing his name, is registered to
vote as Stephanie Lynn Dees. Mr. Ozias fears he will be turned away from the polls
because, in his words, 'I don't really match my photograph and you always get people
who just don't like transgender people ... "').
148
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 249 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing, in another context, that, "as everyone knows, this is an area in
which evenhandedness is not fairness").
149
See Nicole Flatow, New Rule Prohibits Voters in Miami-Dade County from Using
the Restroom, No Matter How Long the Line, THINKPROGESS (Apr. 10, 2014) available at
http:l/thinkprogress.orgryustice/2014/04/10/3425252/new-rule-prohibits-voters-in-miamidade-county-from-using-the-restroom-no-ma tter-how- long-the-line/, archived at http: II
perma.cc/JDY5-YQTC.
150
See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L.
REV. 169, 174-75, 177 (2011) (observing that "a single concept of dignity with fixed
boundaries does not exist" while offering a typology to organize the ways in which the
Supreme Court invokes dignity).
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derived" from its application. 151 The prominence of dignity in the
debate over marriage equality nevertheless invites consideration
of how dignity might find expression in connection with the right
to vote, and a more detailed exploration of the shape that
dignitary interest might take.152
CONCLUSION

The structural similarities between the voting and marriage
cases that followed Windsor and Shelby County provide a lens
through which ~o understand why their trajectories diverged.
These similarities show courts giving greater deference to state
action in the voting cases than in the marriage cases, despite
evidence of intentional discrimination in both. The decisions
accordingly suggest that courts see gradations within the
category of intent-based discrimination and view some types of
intent to be more problematic than others. Indeed, findings of
animus in the marriage cases may have made the voting claims
look weaker than they might have presented independently.
While influence of this sort tends to be more atmospheric than
direct and, accordingly, its very existence is necessarily
speculative, the marriage cases isolated a type of intentional
discrimination that may encourage, or perhaps even prompt,
·some to dismiss the type of discrimination identified in Veasey v.
Perry. 153
One can imagine the marriage cases influencing the voting
cases in a very different way. Their rejection of civil unions and
domestic partnerships as substitutes for marriage was premised
on the idea that same-sex couples should have the same right to
marriage and the dignity it accords as opposite-sex couples
enjoy. 154 That insight has application in the voting context,
where new electoral restrictions deny some voters, invariably
the poor and racial minorities, the ability to vote in
circumstances that others enjoy as a matter of course. These

151

See generally Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial
Interpretation of Human Rights,19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 698 (2008).
152
See Katz, supra note 143.
153
See Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014).
154
See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2014) ("[T]hose
who wish to marry a person of the same sex are entitled to exercise the same
fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the
opposite sex.").
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voters are arguably denied the dignity that follows from having
that opportunity. To date, however, dignitary interests have
played no consequential role in the voting disputes and remain
unlikely to gain traction so long as they remain obscured by the
belief that animus captures the category of intentional
discrimination in its entirety.

